An Allocation Method Using Quota Optimization for the Election of Party-List Proportional Representatives with Equal Votes Per Seat
Abstract
Party-list proportional representation, the most common electoral system under the democracy, can be processed by using various allocation methods. Optimal quota method was proposed in this work based on a simple rule that all representatives must be elected with exactly equal votes per seat. Popular votes were obtained by using computer simulations and from the 2019 Thai general election. It was found that the Hare-Niemeyer with Hare quota used by the election commission of Thailand tends to increase the largest advantage to small parties. The Webster and the Hare-Niemeyer with Droop quota also slightly favor small parties. While the D’Hondt and the optimal quota yield equivalent seats with no advantage to small parties but with an insignificantly favor to medium and large parties. Although there is a statistical difference between these methods, choosing an allotment method should rely on social context thus it would be accepted nationwide. Keywords : proportional representation, allocation methods, optimal quotaReferences
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Lijphart, A. (1990). Consequences the Political of Electoral. American Political Science Review, 84(2), 481–496.
Niemeyer, H. F., & Niemeyer, A. C. (2008). Apportionment methods. Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2),
240–253. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.03.003
Norris, P. (1997). Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems. International Political Science Review, 18(3), 297–312. https://doi.org/10.1177/019251297018003005
Schuster, K., Pukelsheim, F., Drton, M., & Draper, N. R. (2003). Seat biases of apportionment methods for proportional representation. Electoral Studies, 22(4), 651–676.
Turchenko, M., & Shevchuk, S. (2016). Veto players and major electoral reforms in Russia. Russian Politics, 1(2), 203–221. https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00102005
Van Eck, L., Visagie, S., & De Kock, H. (2011). Fairness of seat allocation methods in proportional representation. ORiON, 21(2), 93–110. https://doi.org/10.5784/21-2-22
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Published
2020-05-01
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